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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

fish, wildlife, and recreation as a legitimate purpose for the Aspinall
Unit. Because hydropower, flood control, and fish, wildlife, and
recreational uses were clearly beneficial uses, the court deemed the
water court's finding that the water in the Aspinall Unit was
unavailable for appropriation to Arapahoe to meet the "can and will"
requirement as proper.
The third portion of Arapahoe's argument related to the CRSPA
involved a subordination agreement and marketable pool analysis.
Arapahoe first argued that a subordination agreement created an
additional 60,000 acre-feet of water available for appropriation.
Second, Arapahoe contended the Bureau of Reclamation's
("BUREC") admission that an additional 240,000 acre-feet could be
available through reengineering meant that BUREC was not putting
that amount of water to beneficial use. Therefore, such water was
available for appropriation and could be used to meet the "can and
will" requirement. The court found that the subordination agreement
was selective in that only users within the basin could use the 60,000
acre-feet. Consequently, Arapahoe could not use that water to meet its
requirement. Furthermore, although Arapahoe could not claim any of
the 240,000 acre-feet in the marketable pool for appropriation, it
could contract with BUREC to obtain some. However, the court found
that the marketable pool water could not be included in the "can and
will" analysis either.
The third issue Arapahoe raised concerned whether the water
court had correctly determined the amount of water Taylor Park
Reservoir used. The court found that Arapahoe had previously
litigated this issue, and the water court's conclusions were correct.
Accordingly, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata
prevented Arapahoe from relitigating this claim. Hence, the original
finding stood.
Arapahoe's fourth contention was that it should not have to satisfy
the "can and will" doctrine in order to obtain a conditional right for a
pumping plant still requiring a permit. Since Arapahoe provided little
evidence that it could acquire the permit, the court upheld the water
court's decision that Arapahoe did not meet the requirements of the
"can and will" doctrine.
The court found Arapahoe's fifth claim concerning eminent
domain moot. In addition, the court also found a stipulation
agreement brought up on cross appeal moot. Arapahoe's sixth claim
concerned expert witness testimony.
Rebekah King
Mun. Subdist., N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Getty Oil
Exploration Co., 997 P.2d 557 (Colo. 2000) (holding (1) Getty's
application was not void due to expiration of the statute of limitations;
(2) Getty's activities were sufficient to support the water court's finding
of reasonable diligence; and (3) the water court properly applied the
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relevant statutory sections when considering oil shale industry
economics in making its diligence finding).
Getty Oil Exploration Company ("Getty") owned or controlled
approximately 50,000 acres of land in Garfield and Mesa Counties,
which contain oil shale reserves estimated at thirteen billion gallons.
In a joint venture with OXY USA, Inc. and Chevron Shale Oil
Company, Getty served as operator and proposed a work plan for each
calendar year.
Development of oil shale land requires significant amounts of
water. To maintain its conditional water rights, Getty filed a timely
Application for Finding of Reasonable Diligence and identified all the
conditional waters rights it sought to retain.
The Municipal
Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
("Subdistrict") opposed Getty's application, resulting in a trial before
the water court. The water court held Getty demonstrated reasonable
diligence in maintaining its conditional water rights. The Subdistrict
appealed the water court's ruling alleging three points of error. First,
the Subdistrict argued that Getty's application for reasonable diligence
was void when filed and that Getty could not cure the defect after the
statute of limitations expired. Second, the Subdistrict argued the
record did not support the water court's finding of reasonable
diligence. Third, the Subdistrict asserted that the water court's
interpretation of Colorado Revised Statute section 37-92-301(4) (c) was
inconsistent with Colorado's water resources policy of maximizing
beneficial use. The supreme court reviewed the water court's
interpretation and application of Colorado statutes and case law
concerning conditional rights de novo. The supreme court also
averred that the finding of diligence is a factually driven inquiry
requiring the court to make a case-by-case consideration using several
factors.
The supreme court held that a party's non-compliance with section
7-115-102(1), through its failure to file an application for authority to
transact business, did not require cancellation of conditional water
rights if the party complies before trial. On the issue of diligence, the
court held that the record indicated that Getty's other activities were
sufficient to support a finding of reasonable diligence. The court also
found the water court properly applied the relevant statutory sections
when considering the economics of the oil shale industry in making its
diligence finding.
Based on fairness and the Subdistrict's failure to identify any
resulting prejudice, the supreme court rejected the Subdistrict's
argument that Getty's application was void when filed due to a defect
in Getty's corporate status. The court looked at prior case law and
found "basic fairness favors trial on the merits of contested issues of
fact and law."
In addressing the Subdistrict's contentions that the record failed to
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support a finding of reasonable diligence, the supreme court deferred
to the findings of the water court. To demonstrate reasonable
diligence, Colorado statutory law and case law requires that the
applicant show steady efforts to complete the appropriation in an
expedient and efficient manner under all the facts and circumstances,
and continuous, project-specific efforts directed toward the
development of the conditional right commensurate with the
applicant's capabilities. The court did not disturb the water court's
findings, citing evidence in the record of Getty's investment in stream
gauges, funding of geological investigations, and involvement in
litigation to protect its water rights.
On the Subdistrict's final contention that the water court erred in
its interpretation and application of section 37-92-301(4) (c) to the
facts, the supreme court relied on their decision in Municipal
Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District v. OXY. The
court recognized in OXY that both the "economic feasibility"
requirement and the "can and will" requirement must be considered
together in a diligence analysis, yet economic feasibility is only one
factor that a court should consider in a diligence proceeding. The
court deferred to the water court's finding that the oil shale project
was technically feasible given current technology, thus demonstrating
that Getty "can" complete and "will" go forward with the project.
Sommer Poole
Haystack Ranch, L.L.C. v. Fazzio, 997 P.2d 548 (Colo. 2000)
(affirming the water court's decree of abandonment where the
evidence consisted mainly of the ditches' state of disrepair and lack of
diversion records despite removal of the ditches from the division
engineer's abandonment list).
In 1993, Haystack Ranch, L.L.C. ("Haystack") purchased property
that contained two ditches, the Snyder and Middleton Ditches, with
appropriation dates of 1879 and 1888, respectively. The property
changed hands several times before Haystack acquired it and the chain
of title showed that only the Snyder Ditch was expressly conveyed with
Haystack drew water under its rights from
each transaction.
unauthorized alternate points of diversion, causing curtailment to
Frank Fazzio's ("Fazzio") junior right. As a result, Fazzio filed an
application of abandonment for the water rights of the Snyder and
Middleton Ditches (the "Ditches") and a tort action for damage to his
hay crops.
The Division One Water Court held that the water rights in
question had been abandoned before Haystack acquired them. The
water court considered the Ditches' state of disrepair, the lack of
diversion records, and the long periods of unexcused nonuse. Such

